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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Lagano, Francis Facility: Otisville CF 
NY SID: ·Appeal Control No.: . o9-072-l S B 
DIN: 92-A-1207 
Appearances: Cheryl L. Kates, PC 
P.O. Box 734 
Fairport, New York 14450 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-
months. 
Board Member(s) Crangle, Berliner. 
who pru1icipated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received November 21, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records Ielied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
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undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
. / 
6.mrmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. - -
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separpte fi dingsy~ 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on {';J/c)J 9 6 6. , 
: ,, -!!·;i·iu1;.in: \pp1:;_1]•. I_ ·11it- Appi.:1!:111t - "\pp1.·!la11(:; (\)unsel - in:-!. Parok 1-·ili.: - < 
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STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Lagano, Francis DIN: 92-A-1207
Facility: Otisville CF AC No.: 09-072-18 B
Findings: (Page 1 of 4)
Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious and irrational, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and placed too much 
emphasis on the very serious nature of the multiple crimes of conviction and official opposition to 
Appellant’s release; (2) the Board did not provide sufficient weight to Appellant’s outside 
clearance, rehabilitative efforts, and other achievements; (3) the letter submitted to the Board by 
Appellant’s defense counsel should have been provided greater weight; (4) the Board failed to 
discuss certain issues with Appellant; (5) the Board’s decision was conclusory and lacked 
sufficient detail; (6) the Board did not provide sufficient weight to certain scores contained in 
Appellant’s COMPAS instrument; (7) the Board’s decision was tantamount to a resentencing of 
Appellant; (8) the Board’s decision constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (9) the hold of 24 
months was excessive; (10) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due process 
rights; and (11) Appellant should have been released when comparing his circumstances to those 
of another inmate who was released. 
As to the first three issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if 
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
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e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
            As to the fourth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
As to the fifth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
As to the sixth issue, in 2011 the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk 
and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 
259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the 
COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 
(3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 
640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 
30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 
N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the 
requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
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substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. 
See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, 
declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment 
principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon 
release.  See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of 
rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole 
release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, 
for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—
that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also 
find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, 
or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly 
contradicts the inmate’s assertion that certain low COMPAS scores create a presumption of 
release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397. 
            As to the seventh issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to 
an improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to 
determine the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the 
factors set forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray 
v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State 
Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  
Appellant has not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 As to the eighth issue, the denial of parole under a statute invoking discretion in parole 
determinations does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Carnes v. Engler, 76 Fed. Appx. 79 (6th Cir. 2003); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 
552, 555 (10th Cir.), cert den. 506 U.S. 1008, 113 S. Ct. 624 (1992), rehearing denied 507 U.S. 
955, 113 S. Ct. 1374 (1993); Pacheco v. Pataki, No. 9:07–CV–0850, 2010 WL 3909354, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010).  Appellant’s maximum sentence is life imprisonment. The Board acted 
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within its discretion to hold Appellant for another 24 months, after which he will have the 
opportunity to reappear before the Board. 
 As to the ninth issue, the Board has discretion to hold an inmate for a period of up to 24 
months. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b); Matter of Tatta v. State of 
N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 
604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 
(3d Dept. 2013).  Therefore, the hold of 24 months was not excessive or improper. 
 As to the tenth issue, an inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on 
parole before expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & 
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 
50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 
N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a 
possibility of parole” and thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due 
process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. 
Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
  
As to the eleventh issue, there is no entitlement to community supervision based upon 
comparison with the circumstances of other inmates, as each case is sui generis, and the Board has 
full authority in each instance to give the various factors a unique weighted value. Phillips v. 
Dennison, 41 A.D. 3d 17 (1st Dept. 2007).  
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
